Nomad TV has joined Kyrgyzstan’s television landscape. At first glance, it resembles the kind of small, homespun local channel lampooned in the 2004 film Anchorman. On December 10, its lead story was snowfall in Bishkek, with a reporter roaming the streets asking residents how they were coping with the cold.
“Not really,” most replied, noting that harsh winters are nothing new in the Kyrgyz capital.
“What precautions did you take against the weather?” the reporter asked one man.
“Put on a hat and gloves,” came the dry response.
The segment was followed by a police official urging pedestrians to be careful on icy sidewalks. More soft news followed: updates on the Asman eco-city project at Lake Issyk-Kul, modernization efforts at a Bishkek factory, and the appointment of a new national football coach.
None of these stories were likely to generate much buzz. Indeed, many residents of Bishkek are barely aware the channel exists.
“It hasn’t been a major topic of discussion; the only thing I’ve really noticed is this huge green box installed on the central square,” said Nurbek Bekmurzaev, Central Asia editor at Global Voices, referring to Nomad’s temporary studio on Ala-Too Square.
Yet Nomad is among the best-funded media outlets in the country, reportedly paying salaries double those offered by competitors. In one form or another, the funding appears to come from the Russian state.
That raises an obvious question: why has the Kremlin—already well represented in Kyrgyzstan’s media space—chosen to invest so heavily in another local broadcaster?
A Bold Start
Nomad’s debut coverage was anything but mundane. Broadcasting began on November 23 with a series of high-profile interviews tied to Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Kyrgyzstan from November 25 to 27.
The launch was marked by a lavish ceremony at Bishkek’s opera house, attended by Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova and Kyrgyz Deputy Prime Minister Edil Baisalov. Putin himself praised the channel in a speech on November 26 and granted its chief editor, Natalia Korolevich, an exclusive interview the following day.
This high-profile start followed an intense recruitment drive in the autumn, during which Nomad aggressively poached staff from established newsrooms. Among those who joined were Mirbek Moldabekov, a veteran presenter from state broadcaster UTRK; Erkin Alimbekov, head of Sputnik Kyrgyzstan; and his wife, Svetlana Akmatalieva, a journalist with the National TV and Radio Corporation. The channel’s producer, Anna Abakumova, is a former RT journalist known for reporting from Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.
These tactics have divided Kyrgyzstan’s media community. Journalist Adil Turdukolov told Exclusive.kz that anyone choosing to work for Nomad “is not particularly concerned with the moral or civic aspects” of journalism. Others, speaking anonymously to The Times of Central Asia, said the backlash against Nomad recruits had “become a little hysterical.”
A Warm Welcome
Russia is not alone in operating state-backed media in Kyrgyzstan. Britain’s BBC runs a Kyrgyz-language service, and Radio Azattyk (RFE/RL) continues to receive U.S. congressional funding. However, Rashid Gabdulhakov, an associate professor at the University of Groningen, notes that Nomad’s reception sharply contrasts with that of other foreign outlets.
“The claim that Nomad TV is ‘just another media outlet’ operating freely like the rest is misleading,” he said.
When Azattyk lost U.S. funding in March 2025, President Sadyr Japarov welcomed the decision. “People do not need information from Azattyk,” he said, accusing the outlet of spreading disinformation and endorsing the move by Donald Trump and Elon Musk.
At the same time, independent Kyrgyz media such as Kloop and Temirov Live have been labeled extremist organizations. “Former employees were prosecuted simply for having worked there,” Gabdulhakov noted. “Even liking or sharing Kloop’s content can now be risky.”
By contrast, senior politicians have been eager to grant interviews to Nomad.
“Nomad offers something politically convenient: predictable, Kremlin-aligned messaging that also flatters the authorities in Bishkek, so long as it remains acceptable to Moscow,” Gabdulhakov said.
Russia’s Wider Media Ambitions
Russian channels including Channel One, Russia 24, Kultura, and Zvezda already broadcast in Kyrgyzstan, while state newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta is freely available in cafés. Why add another outlet?
Temur Umarov, a research fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin, argues the motivation may be financial rather than strategic. “I don’t think anyone in Russia is thinking about this in a grand strategic sense,” he said. “It’s more about money—a way of channeling resources for certain people within the media machine.”
Others suggest the project could be an attempt to regain influence on social media after Russian state outlets were removed from YouTube in 2022.
Although Nomad’s links to the Russian state are evident—from its access to Putin to the backgrounds of its staff—its financing remains opaque. Officially, it is described as a Kyrgyz-Russian joint venture.
An investigation by Azattyk traced Nomad’s connections to Evrasia, a little-known non-profit funded by Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor and chaired by Russian Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin. Evrasia, which opened a Russian Cultural Center in Bishkek shortly before Putin’s visit, has been linked to disinformation efforts during Moldova’s 2024 elections and is reportedly involved in training Nomad’s new recruits.
So far, the funding structure appears sufficiently murky to avoid sanctions from major platforms. Nomad has over 6,000 subscribers on YouTube and more than 20,000 followers on Instagram—modest numbers, but potentially indicative of a trial run in exporting Russian influence.
There is irony in the channel’s reliance on U.S.-based platforms. Instagram is banned in Russia after being designated extremist, while YouTube has been throttled by Russia’s internet regulator, making access difficult without a VPN. Similar contradictions exist elsewhere: Chinese state media also use YouTube to spread official narratives despite banning it domestically. As Gabdulhakov put it, “influence strategy takes precedence over ideological consistency.”
Nomad’s launch was soon followed by a broader push abroad. On December 5, RT opened a new bureau in New Delhi.
Is There an Audience?
RT’s expansion in India suggests Moscow sees opportunity in the global south, but Nomad’s approach is markedly different. Its broadcasts avoid foreign wars, migration panics, and loud polemics. There is no bombastic music or frenetic pacing.
Despite the fanfare surrounding its launch and its glossy studio, Nomad’s programming has focused on local, everyday stories. When there is little fresh content, it rebroadcasts NTV, another Russian state channel.
Questions also remain about its reach. While the channel offers Kyrgyz-language programming, Russian is the main broadcast language. “Most people don’t understand Russian well enough to follow news and debates,” Bekmurzaev said.
Still, Nomad’s Kyrgyz-language Instagram account has grown much faster than its Russian counterpart, hinting that social media may be the long-term strategy.
“TV is dead,” Umarov said bluntly. “Everyone is moving from TV to social platforms.”
He is also skeptical that Moscow expects to sway the broader Kyrgyz public. “I’d be surprised if it became an effective tool for spreading Kremlin messaging,” he said. “The audience doesn’t really matter. As long as there’s understanding among the elites, the Kremlin is satisfied—it doesn’t need popular support.”
